Twenty years. Is it a long time or short? For those whose agenda is to forge recent history, the passed time is apparently long enough to begin doing their job, i.e. turn history upside down. On the twentieth anniversary of the bloody crackdown of the independence movement in Azerbaijan, Armenian media introduced yet another ridiculous interpretation of those tragic events. Armenian online resources in one voice justified the brutal killing of more than 130 civilians by the Soviet army, which, they insist, `rushed into the city to finally stop the extermination of Christian Armenians in mostly Muslim capital`. This mission sounds indeed noble, and one can hardly overcome the temptation to say a big `thank you` to the `people`s army`. However, a question arises: how come this ‘humanitarian’ military operation saved no single life and, on the contrary, brought the death of more than 130 innocent people? What was the real aim - to save or kill? Or was it just the `unprofessional` military who failed to find anyone to save but meanwhile `accidentally` killed hundreds of their own citizens during this `desperate` search for those who needed help? What kind of a `rescue operation` is that with this number of `collateral` loss?

By the end of 1989, the political power almost in entire Azerbaijan was taken over by the Popular Front. Communist authorities controlled only their administrative building, nothing else. Popular Front was indeed very popular those days, and that was the result of the complete failure of Abdulrahman Vezirov and his team to gain people`s trust and respect. It was clear to the central communist government in Moscow that during the next parliamentary elections, which was supposed to be launched in mid-February, 1990, the Popular Front would win almost all the seats. The latter did not make any secret that its first decree in the new parliament would be full independence of Azerbaijan. And that would have become the first republic to officially declare its independence, even before the Baltic republics.

While the Soviet authorities could tolerate the loss of some other republics, it was unthinkable for the Kremlin to lose strategically important and energy rich Azerbaijan, whose natural wealth could help to slow down further disintegration of the Soviet Union and postpone the economic collapse even despite the low oil prices in the world market those years. Besides (not the least), the hard-liners in Politburo wanted to teach the others (especially the Baltic nations and Georgians) a “good lesson” of the “right behavior” and warn then against having any second (pro-independence) thought. Thus, Azerbaijan was the natural target to pick for this show.

The hard-liners charged the Kryuchkov-led KGB to begin planning the crackdown of the Popular Front to prevent its coming to power during the approaching elections. The elections were supposed to be postponed, if not cancelled altogether. To intervene, Moscow needed a good pretext. KGB had been assigned with this task well before the January events, some time in the end of 1989. The remaining Armenian residents who had not yet fled the Azerbaijani capital represented a wonderful chance for the central government in Moscow to boil the situation in the city. The pogroms were organized by KGB, which sent its undercover agents to provoke refugees for taking revenge. The violence took place between 13 and 15 January (mostly on the 13th and 14th with minor incidents on the 15th). By 16 January, all the Armenian survivors had been saved and evacuated to safer places mostly by the Popular Front activists, for whom it was not an issue that the pogroms were the KGB`s provocation to be used against the independence movement. 13.000 Soviet troops that were stationed in the city those days silently watched the disturbances and did not act. Being an eyewitness of those events, I asked one of the soldiers, why they simply watched and did nothing to stop the public disorder? The answer was shocking: “we have the order not to intervene and let it happen”. A good question then arises: what was the point of intervention after the violence if there was the order not to intervene during the violence?

Moscow needed the pogroms! It organized and used them. By January 16, Armenians were not an issue any more, as there were no more pogroms in the city, and the survivors had been evacuated. Does anyone wonder how come the Soviet troops, which patiently watched the violence all those three days long, suddenly realized five days after the end of the pogroms, i.e. on 20 January that it was finally the right time to come and save Armenians? The Soviet troops were sent to Baku to save not the Armenians, but the totalitarian empire.

Interesting fact: after the troops had entered Baku, they did not even bother to head toward the areas where ethnic Armenians used to live. Their main concern was taking over governmental buildings and the headquarters of the Popular Front, blow up the TV station, close down newspapers, seal the central election committee, kill the street passers and curios people looking from their windows. What did all this have to do with Armenian residents? Nothing! What threat did the central election committee or the newspapers pose to them? None! The army did NOT care about the Armenians. It used them. On and after 20 January, did the army save at least one Armenian? Not a single soul! It came to kill its own citizens, not to save them.

Of course, the Armenian online resources may argue today (for the purely propaganda purpose) that the army came to save “Christian Armenians” from the “barbarians”. Well, they are free to think whatever they wish to think and continue to praise the army that betrayed and used them in the most cynical way - it`s their business. If they are sure that this argument will support their Nagorno Karabakh cause, no one minds - they can argue whatever they want. However, the truth is that Politburo sent the army not to save Armenians, but to crush the independence movement! In this sense, the tragic events in Baku were profoundly different from those in Sumgait. The latter were spontaneous, Moscow was indeed caught in surprise and sent the army to stop the violence. In Baku, however, KGB itself organized the pogroms because it badly needed them as a handy pretext. Hence, no wonder it acted the way it did.

Vugar Seyidov

Special correspondent of AZERTAC

Berlin